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Abstract 
This paper analyzes and compares the macroeconomic performance of defined-benefit and defined-
contribution pay-as-you-go pension systems when population ages. When the fertility rate decreases or 
longevity rises, it is shown that a shift from defined benefit (defined total benefit or defined annuities) 
to defined contribution always results in higher per-capita income and life-cycle welfare at the steady 
state. All results are derived with general production and utility functions. 
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1 Introduction
All advanced economies and many developing countries are experiencing population aging
characterized by a decrease in the fertility rate and a rise in longevity. Since the Industrial
Revolution, longevity has been increasing steadily almost everywhere in the world while
fertility rates have fluctuated from generation to generation and across countries. The
annual population growth rate in Western countries illustrates these generational cycles
over the last 60 years (Figure 1). The strong decrease in the population growth rate from
1960 to the early 1980s (the so-called baby bust) accounts for the rapid aging of their
population, which has slowed down since then thank to the slight rebound of that rate.
Economies are thus subject to periodic changes in fertility rates, which have significant
but predictable macroeconomic effects. Figure 2 shows that the old-age dependency ratio
increased linearly between 1950 and 2010 and, according to the UN projections, its trend
should rise substantially from 2010 onwards.
There is a lot of concern about the consequences of population aging on the financial
sustainability of pension and health care systems or on potential income growth.1 In
a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system, aging - implying an increase in the old-age
dependency ratio - requires a financial adjustment between the pension benefits and the
pension contributions. On an accounting point of view, this adjustment can be realized
by a reduction in the benefits, an increase in the contributions, or by a combination
of the two. All these options are politically undesirable, which may explain why aging
is also viewed as a worrying prospect. However, the concern should also regard the
macroeconomics of aging. As Barr and Diamond (2006) put it, ”what matters is output”
and one should focus on the macroeconomic effects of changes in the fertility rate and
longevity. On a macroeconomic point of view, standard neoclassical growth models show
1See, for instance, Bo¨s and Weisza¨cker (1989), Cutler et al. (1990), Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1992),
Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2010), EC (2012) and OECD (2013).
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that a decline in fertility reduces the dilution of the capital stock and, therefore, always
yields higher capital accumulation and per-capita income, which is empirically confirmed
by Brander and Dowrick (1994), Kelley and Schmidt (1995) or more recently by Li and
Zhang (2007). Nonetheless, empirical studies find a negative effect of an increase in
the old-age dependency ratio on saving and investment (Li, Zhang, and Zhang 2007).
Regarding longevity, a rise in life expectancy will, with certainty, increase the old-age
dependency ratio and (private and public) expenditures of the elderly. In the absence of
any transfer to the elderly, the macroeconomic effect depends on the reaction of the old
individuals. If they do not change their retirement age, they will save more and capital
accumulation will be higher. If they decide to work longer, they may save less and capital
accumulation will be lower. Empirically, an increase in longevity appears to be favorable
to saving and investment (Li, Zhang, and Zhang 2007). In total, one cannot be conclusive
on the macroeconomics of aging. One conclusion that can be drawn, however, is that there
is no parallelism between the financial accounting and macroeconomic effects of aging.
The introduction of intergenerational transfers under the form of PAYG pensions com-
plicates further the macroeconomics of aging. If the effect of a decline in the fertility
rate is clearly positive on capital accumulation when young people save for retirement in
a fully funded pension scheme, the result is much less clear, as we show in this paper,
if the pension system is PAYG because the dilution of the capital stock is reinforced in
a defined-contribution system while it is weakened in a defined-benefit system. As for
longevity, the macroeconomic effect is ambiguous if retirees are promised to receive de-
fined annuities. All different PAYG pension schemes are not macroeconomic equivalents
and their economic relevance depends strongly on demographic trends. In a number of
countries over the last decades the nature of pension plans has changed dramatically as
coverage has shifted from defined-benefit to defined-contribution arrangements. This shift
started in funded private pension schemes in the US and in the UK. Recently it has hit
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the unfunded public social insurance programs. In particular a number of Continental
European countries with generous pay-as-you-go public schemes have shown an interest
in moving towards defined-contribution format including notional defined-contribution
schemes. This evolution has been motivated by two joint concerns: a better risk-taking
balance between the retirees and the workers and the financial sustainability of the plans
in aging societies.2 Is this evolution sound on a macroeconomic point of view?
The objectives of this paper are to clarify the macroeconomic effects of changes in fertility
and longevity when pension is PAYG and assess the macroeconomic relevance of the shift
from defined-benefit to defined-contribution pension in an aging society. Using an OLG
model a` la Diamond (1965) and general functions for technology and preferences, we
study the implications of a decline in the fertility rate and of an increase in longevity on
the capital accumulation and the welfare of a society with unfunded pensions that can be
either of the defined-contribution (DC) or of the defined-benefit type (defined total benefit
(DB) and defined annuities (DA)). Despite ambiguous effects of declining fertility and of
rising longevity on capital accumulation and welfare depending on the pension scheme,
we show that the shift from a defined-benefit (DB or DA) to a defined-contribution plan
is a right move in terms of both per-capita income and life-cycle welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model with defined-
benefit (DB and DA) and defined-contribution pension schemes. Sections 3 and 4 give
the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the intertemporal equilibrium and the
steady state respectively. Section 5 discusses the effect of a decline in the fertility rate on
capital accumulation and welfare in a DC, a DB and a DA pension system and shows that
a shift from DA (or DB) to DC always results in higher steady-state per-capita income and
life-cycle welfare. Section 6 studies the effect of a rise in longevity on capital accumulation
and welfare in a DC, a DB and a DA pension system and shows that a shift from DA to
2See on this Barr and Diamond (2006) and Munnell (2006).
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Figure 1: Annual population growth and life expectancy in Western countries (1950-2010)
Western countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United King-
dom, United States.
DC (or DB) always results in higher steady-state per-capita income and life-cycle welfare.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a discrete-time deterministic model of an economy producing a single ag-
gregate good under perfect competition from date t = 0 to infinity. The economy is
populated by overlapping generations living for two periods and the population size grows
at a constant rate n ∈] − 1,+∞[. The second period is of length l ∈ [0, 1] (longevity) so
that life expectancy at birth is equal to 1 + l. When young, individuals supply inelasti-
cally one unit of labor to the firms in a perfectly competitive labor market, receive a wage
4
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and allocate this net of tax income between consumption and saving. When old, they
consume the return on their saving and the pension benefit. This benefit is financed by
the contribution of the workers belonging to the next generation.
2.1 Production
The representative firm produces a single good using a neoclassical technology of the form
Yt = AF (Kt, Lt), (1)
where Kt and Lt are respectively the stock of capital and the labor input at time t, and A
is a technological parameter. The output Yt can be consumed or invested in the form of
physical capital. The production function F : R+×R+ → R+ is assumed to be increasing
in its arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree 1. We assume that physical capital
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fully depreciates after one period. At time t, the representative firm chooses the stock of
capital Kt and the labor input Lt and maximizes its profits
pit = max
Kt,Lt
AF (Kt, Lt)− wtLt − (1 + rt)Kt, (2)
where wt is the wage, (1 + rt)Kt is the return distributed to the owners of physical
capital (households) and rt the real interest rate. Since returns to scale are constant, the
production function can be written in intensive form
yt = Af(kt), (3)
where f(kt) = F (kt, 1), kt ≡ Kt/Lt is the capital stock per worker and yt is the income
per worker.
2.2 Pension
We assume that the government introduces a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system in
the first period. The first old generation thus benefits from a free lunch. The other
generations pay a lump-sum tax when young and receive a lump-sum pension or annuities
when old. The pension financing constraint is
pt = (1 + n)τt, (4)
where pt is the individual pension received by the old individual born at time t − 1 and
τt ! 0 is the lump-sum tax levied by the government on each young worker born at time t.
The pension pt is thus an intergenerational transfer from the young to the old individuals.
In a defined-annuities pension system, pt = atl where at is the annuity paid to surviving
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agents. We will assume throughout the paper that the pension, the tax and the annuity
are constant across generations: pt = p, τt = τ and at = a for any t and given n and l.
We consider three PAYG pension systems: a defined-benefit (DB) pension system, in
which the pension is constant across all generations and the tax adjusts to the value of
n, a defined-contribution (DC) pension system, in which the lump-sum tax is constant
across all generations and the pension adjusts to the value of n and a defined-annuity
(DA) pension system in which an annuity is paid to old agents while alive and the tax
adjusts to the longevity (l) of old agents and to fertility (n).
2.3 Preferences
The consumer’s preferences are represented by the following life-cycle utility function
U = u(ct) + βlu(dt+1), (5)
where, for all c, d > 0, it is assumed that u′(.) > 0, u′′(.) < 0 and limc→0 u′(c) = +∞.
The consumer’s problem will be studied within the three pension systems:
i) when the pension system is DC, the representative consumer maximizes (5) subject to
the budget constraints
ct + st = wt − τ (6)
dt+1 = (1 + n)τ + (1 + rt+1)st (7)
ii) when the pension system is DB, the representative consumer maximizes (5) subject
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to the budget constraints
ct + st = wt − p
1 + n
(8)
dt+1 = p+ (1 + rt+1)st (9)
iii) when the pension system is DA, the representative consumer maximizes (5) subject
to the budget constraints
ct + st = wt − al
1 + n
(10)
dt+1 = al + (1 + rt+1)st (11)
In all three systems, wt, ct, st are respectively the first-period wage, the consumption
when young and the individual saving at time t. When old, the individuals consume dt+1
that must satisfy the budget constraint composed of the gross return on saving and the
pension benefit. The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) is the psychological discount factor.
2.4 Optimal Behavior
The consumer’s optimization problem is well-defined if and only if
0 < τ < wt ∀t (12)
The maximization of (2) with respect to Kt and Lt by the representative firm yields the
wage rate and the interest rate. The expressions for the wage rate and the interest rate
are thus the optimal return of labor and capital respectively:
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wt = w(kt) = f(kt)− ktf ′(kt) (13)
rt = r(kt) = f
′(kt)− 1 (14)
The maximization of (5) with respect to the corresponding budget constraints yields
the optimal level of individual saving, which is characterized by the following first-order
condition in the DC system
u′(wt − st − τ) = βl(1 + rt+1)u′ [(1 + n)τ + (1 + rt+1)st] , (15)
in the DB system, by
u′
(
wt − st − p
1 + n
)
= βl(1 + rt+1)u
′ [p+ (1 + rt+1)st] , (16)
and, in the DA system, by
u′
(
wt − st − al
1 + n
)
= βl(1 + rt+1)u
′ [al + (1 + rt+1)st] , (17)
where st, the solution to the maximization problem, is positive if condition (12) is satisfied.
The saving function st is increasing in the first-period wage wt and decreasing in the
pension p (or al) or the lump-sum tax τ . In order to study the sign of the derivative of
the saving function with respect to fertility and longevity, we rewrite Equation (15) as
the following function in the DC system
−u′(wt − st − τ) + βl(1 + rt+1)u′ [(1 + n)τ + (1 + rt+1)st] = 0 (18)
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and Equation (16) as the following function in the DB system
−u′
(
wt − st − p
1 + n
)
+ βl(1 + rt+1)u
′ [p+ (1 + rt+1)st] = 0. (19)
and Equation (17) as the following function in the DA system
−u′
(
wt − st − al
1 + n
)
+ βl(1 + rt+1)u
′ [al + (1 + rt+1)st] = 0. (20)
The effect of an increase in the fertility rate on saving is unambiguously negative in the
DC system
[
∂st
∂n
]DC
= − β(1 + rt+1)τu
′′(dt+1)
u′′(ct) + βl(1 + rt+1)2u′′(dt+1)
< 0 (21)
and unambiguously positive in the DB and DA systems
[
∂st
∂n
]DB
=
[
∂st
∂n
]DA
=
p
(1+n)2u
′′(ct)
u′′(ct) + βl(1 + rt+1)2u′′(dt+1)
> 0. (22)
with al = p.
Similarly, we can determine the effect of a change in longevity on savings under any of
the three pension systems:
[
∂st
∂l
]DC
=
[
∂st
∂l
]DB
= − βu
′(dt+1)(1 + rt+1)
u′′(ct) + βl(1 + rt+1)2u′′(dt+1)
> 0 (23)
which is unambiguously positive and,
[
∂st
∂l
]DA
= −u
′′(ct) a1+n + β(1 + rt+1) (u
′(dt+1) + alu′′(dt+1))
u′′(ct) + βl(1 + rt+1)2u′′(dt+1)
(24)
whose sign is ambiguous.
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3 Intertemporal Equilibrium
The equilibrium in the labor market is given by the equality between the supply and
demand for labor. The equilibrium in the capital market derives from the national income
accounts identity
Kt+1 = Ntst, (25)
where Kt+1, non-negative by definition, is the aggregate capital stock at t+1 and Ntst is
the aggregate saving from the young generation t, which finances the capital stock at time
t+ 1. Feasibility requires positive saving st. In intensive form, equation (25) becomes
(1 + n)kt+1 = st, (26)
where kt+1 ≡ Kt+1Lt+1 is the capital stock per worker.
In order to check the existence of at least one intertemporal equilibrium, we can rewrite
Equation (26) in the form of the function
φ(kt+1, kt;n) ≡ (1 + n)kt+1 − st = 0, (27)
where st ≡ s[w(kt), r(kt+1)].
Since the function φ(kt+1, kt;n) is continuous with respect to kt+1, one can prove that there
exists at least one kt+1 given kt, i.e. there exists at least one intertemporal equilibrium,
by showing that the limits of the function are of opposite sign (see de la Croix and Michel
(2002), p. 20). As for the uniqueness of the intertemporal equilibrium, it is sufficient to
assume that the function is strictly increasing in kt+1 (see de la Croix and Michel (2002),
p. 25). This requires that
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s2[w(kt), r(kt+1)] >
1 + n
f ′′(kt+1)
, (28)
where s2[w(kt), r(kt+1)] is the first derivative of s with respect to r(kt+1). On the right-
hand side of (28), the numerator is positive and the denominator is negative. Therefore,
if condition (28) is verified, i.e. if young and old consumptions are gross substitutes, for
any given wt > 0, there exists an intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight and it
is unique.
4 Steady State
The intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight is characterized by the dynamics of
the capital stock per worker kt. Equation (27) determines the saving locus implicitly. By
differentiating Equation (27) with respect to kt+1 and kt we obtain
dkt+1
dkt
=
−s1[w(kt), r(kt+1)]f ′′(kt)kt
1 + n− s2[w(kt), r(kt+1)]f ′′(kt+1) > 0, (29)
where dkt+1dkt is the slope of the saving locus and s1[w(kt), r(kt+1)] is the first derivative
with respect to w(kt). The numerator of (29) is positive and the denominator is pos-
itive if condition (28) is verified. Since (29) is positive, the dynamics of the capital
stock kt is monotonic. This monotonic sequence of kt is bounded as st < w(kt) and
limkt→+∞
w(kt)
kt
= 0 (see de la Croix and Michel (2002), p. 31). Therefore, our model with
overlapping generations living for two periods admits at least one steady state in the three
pension systems. The number of steady states depends on the forms of the utility and
the production functions. At a steady state, Equation (27) becomes
φ(k¯;n) = (1 + n)k¯ − s[w(k¯), r(k¯)] = 0. (30)
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At a steady state, the slope of the saving locus is given by
dkt+1
dkt
∣∣∣∣
kt=k¯
=
−s1[w(k¯), r(k¯)]f ′′(k¯)k¯
1 + n− s2[w(k¯), r(k¯)]f ′′(k¯) (31)
This steady state is stable if Equation (31) is less than 1. When utility is logarithmic and
production is Cobb-Douglas such that yt = Akαt , Equation (31) is equal to α < 1.
5 Fertility, Pension, Capital Accumulation and wel-
fare
Our first objective is to examine the effect of fertility on capital accumulation in this
OLG model at stable steady states. The PAYG pension system can be based on defined
contribution (DC), defined benefit (DB) or defined annuities (DA). Since the effects of a
change in fertility are identical in the model with DA and in the model with DB, we only
derive results with DA and compare them to those with DC. In the next four sections, we
show that the effect of fertility on capital accumulation and welfare varies depending on
the PAYG pension scheme.
5.1 Defined-Contribution Pension Scheme
In this section, we assume that the PAYG pension scheme is based on defined contribution,
i.e., the lump-sum tax is constant for any value of the fertility rate n. Therefore, the value
of the pension will adjust to the value of n.
Proposition 1 In a model with overlapping generations living for two periods and with a
PAYG pension system based on defined contribution, a decrease (increase) in the fertility
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rate n has a positive (negative) effect on the steady-state level of capital per worker when
the economy is at a stable steady state.
Proof: Using the function (27), we can calculate dk¯dn :
[
dk¯
dn
]DC
= −
k¯ + βl[1+r(k¯)]τu
′′(d¯)
u′′(c¯)+βl[1+r(k¯)]2u′′(d¯)
1 + n+ s1[w(k¯), r(k¯)]f ′′(k¯)k¯ − s2[w(k¯), r(k¯)]f ′′(k¯) (32)
which is negative since the denominator is positive when the steady state is stable (i.e.
when Equation (31) is less than one). "
Therefore, if two countries, with PAYG pension systems based on defined contribution, are
identical in all respects except in the fertility rate, the country with a higher fertility rate
will have a higher steady-state pension per old individual and a lower capital accumulation
per worker. A rise in the fertility rate increases the value of the pension and the dilution
of the capital stock. These two effects reduce capital accumulation.
5.2 Defined-Benefit and Defined-Annuity Pension Schemes
We now assume that the PAYG pension scheme is based on defined annuities (DA). As
mentioned before, all the results would be identical if the pension system were based on
DB. The pension is constant for any value of the fertility rate n. Therefore, the value of
the lump-sum tax will adjust to the value of n. In this case, the first effect that is obtained
without pension is naturally negative. Yet, the second effect that operates through the
PAYG system is positive and this makes the overall outcome ambiguous.
Proposition 2 In a model with overlapping generations living for two periods and with
a PAYG pension system based on defined annuities (or on defined benefit), a change in
the fertility rate n has an ambiguous effect on the steady-state level of capital per worker.
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Parameter α βl A p
Value 13 0.75 10 3
Table 1: Parameter values used in Figure 3
Proof: Using the function (27), we can calculate dk¯dn :
[
dk¯
dn
]DA
= −
k¯ −
al
(1+n)2
u′′(c¯)
u′′(c¯)+βl[1+r(k¯)]2u′′(d¯)
1 + n+ s1[w(k¯), r(k¯)]f ′′(k¯)k¯ − s2[w(k¯), r(k¯)]f ′′(k¯) (33)
For low values of n, it is well possible that the effect of an increase in the fertility rate n
is positive on capital accumulation per worker. When the fertility rate is high, the effect
becomes negative as in the model with a defined-contribution pension scheme. A rise in
the fertility rate decreases the lump-sum tax and, hence, increases saving. This positive
effect on capital accumulation may offset, for low values of n, the negative effect of the
higher dilution of the capital stock. "
In order to illustrate the ambiguity of the effect of an increase in the fertility rate on the
capital stock per worker when pensions are characterized by defined annuities (or defined
benefit), we propose a numerical exercise based on a logarithmic utility function and a
Cobb-Douglas production function. The parameter values of this numerical exercise are
given in Table 1. We run simulations for the model at the steady state for values of the
fertility rate n ranging from 0 to 50%. Figure 1 represents the steady-state values of the
capital stock per worker k¯, which follow an inverted U-shape. With defined contribution,
the profile of k¯ would be monotonically declining.
5.3 Macroeconomic Effects of a Decline in Fertility (n)
In this section, we determine which pension system leads to the highest steady-state level
of income per capita when the fertility rate decreases in two economies which are initially
identical in all respects except their pension scheme.
15
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Figure 3: Steady-state capital stock per worker as a function of the fertility rate (defined
benefit or defined annuities)
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Proposition 3 If two economies with a stable steady state are initially identical in all
respects (in particular, al = p = (1 + n)τ) except their pension scheme, a decline in the
fertility rate (n) always results in a higher steady state per-capita income in the economy
with a defined-contribution scheme than in the economy with a defined-annuity (or defined
benefit) scheme.
Proof: Using Equations (32) and (33), we obtain:
[
dk¯
dn
]DA
−
[
dk¯
dn
]DC
= −
k¯ −
al
(1+n)2
u′′(c¯)
u′′(c¯)+βl[1+r(k¯)]2u′′(d¯)
1 + n+ s1[w(k¯), r(k¯)]f ′′(k¯)k¯ − s2[w(k¯), r(k¯)]f ′′(k¯)
+
k¯ + βl[1+r(k¯)]τu
′′(d¯)
u′′(c¯)+βl[1+r(k¯)]2u′′(d¯)
1 + n+ s1[w(k¯), r(k¯)]f ′′(k¯)k¯ − s2[w(k¯), r(k¯)]f ′′(k¯)
=
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
al
(1 + n)2
u′′(c¯) + βl[1 + r(k¯)]τu′′(d¯)(
1 + n+ s1(w(k¯), r(k¯))f
′′(k¯)k¯ − s2(w(k¯), r(k¯))f ′′(k¯)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
× 1(
u′′(c¯) + βl[1 + r(k¯)]2u′′(d¯)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0 (34)
This proves Proposition 3. "
This shows that if an economy is facing a decrease in its fertility rate (n), it will end up
with a higher stock of capital and hence income per capita under a defined-contribution
pension scheme than under a defined-annuity (or defined-benefit) scheme.
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5.4 Welfare Effect of a Decline in Fertility (n)
We now study the effect of a decrease in the fertility rate n on the individual steady-
state life-cycle welfare in the two pension systems. We focus on economies which are
initially dynamically efficient (i.e. r(k¯) ≥ n) and that have the same initial k¯. The
change in steady-state life-cycle utility following a decline in the fertility rate is potentially
ambiguous under each system. However, we prove that the relative effect on welfare is
unambiguous when we are comparing economies which only differ in their pension system.
Proposition 4 Assume an economy with a stable steady state which is initially dynami-
cally efficient. A decline in the fertility rate (n) has an ambiguous effect on the steady-state
life-cycle utility for the defined-contribution and the defined-annuity (or defined-benefit)
pension systems. In a neighborhood of the golden rule, a decline in the fertility rate has
an unambiguously negative impact on steady-state life-cycle utility under the two pension
systems.
Proof: Let us define U¯j as the steady-state life-cycle utility under pension scheme j ∈
{DC,DA} :
U¯DC = u
[
f(k¯)− k¯f ′(k¯)− τ − (1 + n)k¯]+ βlu [(1 + n)τ + f ′(k¯)k(1 + n)] (35)
U¯DA = u
[
f(k¯)− k¯f ′(k¯)− al
1 + n
− (1 + n)k¯
]
+ βlu
[
al + f ′(k¯)k(1 + n)
]
(36)
We can determine the effect of a change in the fertility rate (n) on the steady-state life-
cycle utility of an agent under the two pension systems as:
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dU¯DC
dn
=
∂U¯DC
∂n
+
∂U¯DC
∂k¯
[
dk¯
dn
]DC
(37)
dU¯DA
dn
=
∂U¯DA
∂n
+
∂U¯DA
∂k¯
[
dk¯
dn
]DA
(38)
which gives:
dU¯DC
dn
= βlτu′(d¯) + k¯f ′′(k¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−u′(c¯) + βl(1 + n)u′(d¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0 by dyn. eff.
[dk¯
dn
]DC
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(39)
dU¯DA
dn
=
al
(1 + n)2
u′(c¯) + k¯f ′′(k¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−u′(c¯) + βl(1 + n)u′(d¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0 by dyn. eff.
[dk¯
dn
]DA
︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
(40)
The first term on the RHS of Equations (39) and (40) is positive while the second term
is potentially negative in both cases. This implies that the total effect of a decline of the
fertility rate on the life-cycle utility is potentially positive under any pension system. At
the golden rule, however, it is unambiguously negative under any pension system as the
second term on the RHS of Equations (39) and (40) is equal to zero in this case. "
Even though, the effect of a decline of the fertility rate is ambiguous under any pension
system, we can show that the steady-state life-cycle utility of two economies initially
differing only in their pension systems is always higher in the economy with a defined-
contribution pension after a decline in the fertility rate:
Proposition 5 If two economies with a stable steady state are initially dynamically ef-
ficient and identical in all respects except their pension scheme (in particular, al = p =
(1 + n)τ), a decline in the fertility rate (n) always results in a higher (or equal) steady-
19
state life-cycle utility in the economy with a defined-contribution system than than in the
economy with a defined-annuity (or defined benefit) scheme.
Proof: We can determine the effect of a change in the fertility rate (n) on the relative
steady-state life-cycle utility of an agent under DA and DC as:
d(U¯DC − U¯DA)
dn
=
∂(U¯DC − U¯DA)
∂n
+
∂U¯DC
∂k¯
[
dk¯
dn
]DC
− ∂U¯DA
∂k¯
[
dk¯
dn
]DA
(41)
Focusing on the first element of the RHS of Equation (41) at a dynamically efficient steady
state, we find:
∂(U¯DC − U¯DA)
∂n
=
τ
1 + n
(
βl(1 + n)u′(d¯)− u′(c¯)) ≤ 0 (42)
as r ! n. We now turn to the second part of the RHS of (41).
Noting that ∂(U¯DC)∂k =
∂(U¯DA)
∂k when the two economies are initially similar in all respects
except their pension system, we can rewrite Equation (41) as:
d(U¯DC − U¯DA)
dn
=
∂(U¯DC − U¯DA)
∂n
+
∂U¯DC
∂k¯
([
dk¯
dn
]DC
−
[
dk¯
dn
]DA)
(43)
where
∂U¯DC
∂k¯
= k¯f ′′(k¯)[−u′(c¯) + βl(1 + n)u′(d¯)] ≥ 0 (44)
All this proves that, at a dynamically efficient steady state:
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d(U¯DC − U¯DA)
dn
=
∂(U¯DC − U¯DA)
∂n︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+
∂U¯DC
∂k︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0

[
dk¯
dn
]DC
−
[
dk¯
dn
]DA
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 (Proposition 3)
 ≤ 0 (45)
"
Combined with the results in the previous section, this shows that an economy facing
a decrease in its fertility rate should adopt a defined-contribution pension scheme if its
goal is to maximize its steady-state income per capita and life-cycle utility ceteris paribus.
Indeed, its income per capita would be strictly higher and its life-cycle utility at least as
high as under DA (or DB).
6 Longevity, Pension, Capital Accumulation andWel-
fare
The previous section has shown that a defined-contribution pension system leads to both
higher steady-state per-capita income and life-cycle utility than any of the other two
systems after a decline in the fertility rate. We now study the consequences of another
cause of aging i.e. an increase in longevity. As regards longevity, the model with DC
is identical to the model with DB. Therefore, we only derive results for DA and DC,
knowing that, this time, DC is equivalent to DB. First, we show that the effect of longevity
on capital accumulation and welfare can vary depending on the PAYG pension scheme.
Second, when longevity rises, we show that a defined-contribution pension system always
leads to higher steady-state per-capita income and life-cycle utility than a defined-annuity
system.
21
6.1 Defined-Contribution and Defined-Benefit Pension Schemes
In this section, we study the effect of an increase in longevity on capital accumulation in
DC (or DB) pension system.
Proposition 6 In a model with overlapping generations living for two periods and with
a PAYG pension system based on defined contribution (or defined benefit), an increase
(decrease) in longevity (l) has a positive (negative) effect on the steady-state level of capital
per worker when the economy is at a stable steady state.
Proof: Using the function (27), we can calculate dk¯dl as:
[
dk¯
dl
]DC
= − βu
′(d¯)f ′(k¯)1 + n+ s1(w¯, r¯)f ′′(k¯)k¯ − s2(w¯, r¯)f ′′(k¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
u′′(c¯) + βl[f ′(k¯)]2u′′(d¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 (46)
which is strictly positive. "
6.2 Defined-Annuity Pension Scheme
The effect of an increase in longevity on steady-state per-capita income in a defined-
annuity pension scheme is different from that in any of the other two pension systems
as a change in l leads to a modification of the total pension paid to retired agents. As
retirees are promised a fixed annuity, an increase in their life expectancy requires to be
financed by a higher tax. In this case, the effect of an increase in longevity on steady-state
per-capita income is ambiguous.
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Parameter α β A a n
Value 13 0.75 10 3 0.2
Table 2: Parameter values used in Figure 4
Proposition 7 In a model with overlapping generations living for two periods and with a
PAYG pension system based on defined annuities, a change in longevity l has an ambiguous
effect on the steady-state level of capital per worker.
Proof: Using the function (27), we can calculate dk¯dl as:
[
dk¯
dl
]DA
=
a
1+nu
′′(c¯) + βf ′(k¯)
 >0︷︸︸︷u′(d¯) + alu′′(d¯)

1 + n+ s1(w¯, r¯)f ′′(k¯)k¯ − s2(w¯, r¯)f ′′(k¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
u′′(c¯) + βl[f ′(k¯)]2u′′(d¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 (47)
The sign of Equation (47) is ambiguous as the numerator can either be positive or negative.
"
Figure 4 illustrates the ambiguity of the effect a change in l on steady-state capital and
income per capita when the pension system is based on defined annuities. This example is
based on a Cobb-Douglas production function and a logarithmic utility with the parameter
values reported in Table 6.2.
6.3 Macroeconomic Effects of an Increase in Longevity (l)
In this section, we compare the effect on steady-state per-capita income of an increase in
longevity l for economies with DC and DA pension systems.
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Figure 4: Steady-state capital stock per worker as a function of longevity (defined annu-
ities)
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Proposition 8 If two economies with a stable steady state are initially identical in all
respects (in particular, al = p = (1 + n)τ) except their pension scheme, an increase in
longevity (l) always results in a lower steady-state per-capita income in the economy with
a defined-annuity scheme than in an economy with a defined-contribution (or defined-
benefit) scheme.
Proof: We need to compare
[
dk¯
dl
]DA
and
[
dk¯
dl
]DC
:
[
dk¯
dl
]DA
−
[
dk¯
dl
]DC
=
− a1+nu′′(c¯)− βalf ′(k¯)u′′(d¯)1 + n+ s1(w¯, r¯)f ′′(k¯)k¯ − s2(w¯, r¯)f ′′(k¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
u′′(c¯) + βl[f ′(k¯)]2u′′(d¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 < 0
(48)
"
A change in longevity does not directly alter the tax in the DC system (nor the pension
in the DB system). The impact of a rise in longevity on income per capita comes from
increased saving of young agents who are experiencing a longer retirement period. This
in turn affects the stock of capital and hence income per capita. Equation (23) shows
that the effect of increased longevity on savings is the same under DC and DB pension
systems. Under defined annuities, however, the tax paid when young as well as the
pension received when old are modified. Higher longevity results in higher taxes and
pension benefits. This tends to decrease savings (see Equation (24)) and hence capital
accumulation. As a result, an economy facing an increase in longevity ends up with a
lower steady-state stock of capital and income per capita under a defined-annuity pension
scheme than under a defined-contribution (or defined-benefit) pension system.
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6.4 Welfare Effect of an Increase in Longevity (l)
This section studies the effect of an increase in longevity on the steady-state life-cycle
utility under the DC and DA pension systems. The effect of a change in longevity on
welfare in any of the two systems is ambiguous.
Proposition 9 Assume an economy with a stable steady state which is initially dynam-
ically efficient. A increase in longevity (l) has an ambiguous effect on the steady-state
life-cycle utility for the defined-contribution (or defined-benefit) and the defined-annuity
pension systems.
Proof:
dU¯DC
dl
=
dU¯DB
dl
= βu(d¯) + k¯f ′′(k¯)
(
βl(1 + n)u′(d¯)− u′(c¯)) [dk¯
dl
]DC
(49)
dU¯DA
dl
= − a
1 + n
u′(c¯) + β
(
u(d¯) + alu′(d¯)
)
+ k¯f ′′(k¯)
(
βl(1 + n)u′(d¯)− u′(c¯)) [dk¯
dl
]DA
(50)
where the signs of (49) and (50) are ambiguous. "
Even though the effect of an increase in longevity has an ambiguous effect on steady-state
life-cycle utility under any of the two pension systems, we can derive an unambiguous
ranking across systems in terms of steady-state welfare.
Proposition 10 If two economies with a stable steady state are initially dynamically
efficient and identical in all respects except their pension scheme (in particular, al = p =
(1 + n)τ), an increase in longevity (l) always results in a lower (or equal) steady-state
life-cycle utility in the economy with a defined-annuity pension system than in an economy
with a defined-contribution (or defined-benefit) pension system.
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Proof: It is enough to compare the derivatives obtained in the proof of Proposition 9.
d(U¯DA − U¯DC)
dl
=
a
1 + n
 ≤0︷ ︸︸ ︷−u′(c¯) + βl(1 + n)u′(d¯)

+ k¯f ′′(k¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−u′(c¯) + βl(1 + n)u′(d¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0

[dk¯dl
]DA
−
[
dk¯
dl
]DC
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 ≤ 0(51)
"
Propositions 8 and 10 show that an economy facing an increase in longevity should never
choose a defined-annuity pension system if its objective is to maximize steady-state income
per capita and life-cycle utility. Indeed, defined annuities result in both a lower income per
capita and at most as high a life-cycle utility as defined-benefit and defined-contribution
systems. DB and DC do equally well in this case.
7 Conclusion
Declining fertility rates and rising longevity are the two causes of aging. When the pension
system is PAYG there are two options: either an increase in the contribution to maintain
the benefit as in a defined-annuity (or defined-benefit) scheme or a decrease in the benefit
to maintain the contribution as in a defined-contribution scheme. This paper shows that
the two options are not equivalent regarding their macroeconomic effects. When fertility
declines and longevity increases, it is always better to shift from defined annuities to
defined contribution.
In this paper, we show that the defined-contribution pension system is the system which
leads to the best outcome in terms of both steady-state income per capita and welfare
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Best pension system(s) after
in terms of n ↓ l ↑
k¯ and y¯ DC DC and DB
U¯ DC DC and DB
Table 3: Ranking of pension systems
when confronted with an aging population. This is true whether aging is due to a decrease
in the fertility rate and/or increased longevity (see Table 3).
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